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1. Introduction
Prior research on graph usage in annual reports has
documented two important facts. First, graph
usage increases when company performance im-
proves (e.g. Steinbart, 1989 and Beattie and Jones,
1992). Second, an important proportion of graphs
are distorted to portray a more favourable view of
the company than reflected in the financial state-
ments (e.g. Beattie and Jones, 1999 and Mather et
al., 1996). Thus, the existing literature supports the
notion that managers use distorted graphs to man-
age the impression created in the perceptions of
users of annual reports1 (e.g. Beattie and Jones,
2000). However, Beattie and Jones (2008: 22),
after reviewing the existing literature on graph
usage in annual reports, conclude:
‘A fundamental issue to be addressed by future
research is whether an impact on a user’s percep-
tions of the organisation carries through to an
impact on their decision. For example, are in-
vestment decisions affected by graphical presen-
tation choices? We need, therefore, to carry out
research into the effect, if any, of financial
graphs on analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock
prices and the relationship decisions of other key
stakeholder groups such as employees, cus-
tomers and suppliers’
From a theoretical point of view, the potential ef-
fect of graph distortion on the functioning of the
stock market is a controversial issue. On the one
hand, the literature on ‘herding’ and ‘limited atten-
tion’ in financial markets shows that economic
agents may neglect a considerable part of their 
private information because of reputation and co-
ordination effects or information processing limi-
tations.2 Consequently, graphs can have an impact
on users’ judgments and decisions, even when the
information represented in graphs can be gathered
also in other parts of the annual report. On the
other hand, the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH) tells us that prices should include all the
publicly available information. Hence, graph dis-
tortion should not affect prices because they
should be based on all the information available on
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1 Impression management techniques in annual reports are
not limited to the use and distortion of graphs. Extant research
provides evidence consistent with the use of narratives as an
impression management technique (e.g. Clatworthy and
Jones, 2003; Aerts, 2005).
2 A more detailed review of this literature is provided in the
next section of the paper.
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the annual report and not only on the image por-
trayed by graphs. Our aim is to provide empirical
evidence that improves our understanding of this
controversial issue and take a step forward in the
direction indicated by Beattie and Jones (2008).
As an indicator of the capital market effects of
graph distortion we use the cost of equity capital,
measured both on an ex-ante (i.e. expected) and an
ex-post (i.e. realised) basis.3 The ex-ante measure
is based on analysts’ forecasts of earnings issued at
a certain point in time, soon after the publication
of the annual report. This measure depends direct-
ly on the expectations of those analysts following
the company at the time forecasts are issued.
Based on the evidence provided by literature on
herding and limited attention, we hypothesise that
these expectations can be biased because of dis-
torted graphs included in annual reports. However,
on the grounds of the EMH, we do not expect
graph distortion to affect our ex-post measure of
the cost of equity, realised returns. Since realised
returns aggregate the decisions taken by investors
over a relatively large period of time (one year),
we expect that the potential bias in analysts’ per-
ceptions is corrected in the market by means of the
aggregation process and the passing of time that
allows new information to be impounded in stock
prices.4
We base our analysis on a sample of Spanish
companies quoted in the Madrid Stock Exchange
(MSE) between 1996 and 2002. As compared to
the US or the UK, where most prior studies on
graphs have been developed, Spain has still a rela-
tively underdeveloped capital market, where levels
of corporate transparency are generally low.5
Moreover, prior research documents the existence
of a higher level of herding in Spain than in coun-
tries with more developed capital markets.6 If
graph distortion is able to bias the perceptions of
market participants, that is more likely to be ob-
served in those markets, such as the MSE, with
low corporate transparency and high levels of
herding. When comparing US and European stock
markets (excluding the UK), Bagella et al. (2007)
find that the absolute bias in earnings forecasts is
significantly higher in Europe than in the US. This
is why we believe that the MSE is well suited to
investigate whether graph distortion affects per-
ceptions and decisions of market participants.
After controlling for other possible determinants
of the cost of equity, we detect a significant nega-
tive effect of favourable graph distortion on our
ex-ante measure of the cost of equity. This effect is
moderated by the overall level of disclosure so
that, at high levels of transparency, the relationship
between graph distortion and the ex-ante cost of
equity becomes positive. However, when we turn
to the ex-post analysis, we do not find any signifi-
cant effect of graph distortion on realised returns.
We interpret this result as evidence that the effect
on the ex-ante cost of equity is only temporary and
confined to expectations. It is really an effect on
the bias of the analysts’ forecasts that are used to
calculate the ex-ante measure of the cost of equity.
However, with the passing of time the aggregation
process performed in the market corrects this bias.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold.
First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to provide empirical evidence on the capital mar-
ket effects of graph distortion for quoted firms.
Graph distortion is an ideal item from which to
study the economic effects of impression manage-
ment techniques. As stated by Merkl-Davies and
Brennan (2007), the study of these effects is com-
plicated by the difficulty of separating impression
management (opportunistic distortion of informa-
tion) from incremental information (provision of
useful additional information). However, graph
distortion, as an impression management tech-
nique, is not affected by this problem. Given that
the information portrayed in graphs is always
available in another format in the same annual re-
port, we can assume that distorted graphs are pure
impression management tools and do not provide
any incremental information.
Second, we provide additional evidence that
supports the necessity of distinguishing between
estimations by individuals and aggregated market
behaviour, when studying the capital market ef-
fects of impression management techniques.
Short-term effects on individuals’ predictions can
be corrected with the passing of time by the aggre-
gation role played by market activity, so that they
do not have an impact on long-window stock re-
turns.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the
next section we review the existing literature and
develop our research hypotheses. In Section 3 we
describe our sample and the variables that we use
in our empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the
84 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 A review of the issues involved in the empirical measure-
ment of the cost of equity capital can be found, for example,
in Botosan (2006).
4 Temporary differences between ex-ante and ex-post meas-
ures of the cost of equity are depicted in Figure 1 and dis-
cussed in detail in section 3.2.1.
5 According to the World Federation of Exchanges, in 2002,
the latest year covered in our analysis, total value of share trad-
ing in the MSE was $653,221m as compared to $4,001,340m
for the London Stock Exchange or $10,310,055m for the New
York Stock Exchange. Additionally, La Porta et al. (2006) pro-
vide evidence showing that the MSE has a lower index of dis-
closure requirements (0.50, as compared to 0.83 and 1.00 for
the UK and the US, respectively) and public enforcement
(0.33 as compared to 0.68 and 0.90 for the UK and the US, re-
spectively) .
6 Ferruz Agudo et al. (2008) report a level of herding of
13.26% for Spain, a figure similar to that observed by Lobao
and Serra (2002) for Portugal, but much higher than the 2%
found by Lakonishok et al. (1992) for the US or the 3.3% ob-
served by Wylie (2005) in the UK.
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main results of our analysis. Section 5 summarises
the analysis, provides some conclusions and draws
implications.
2. Background and hypotheses 
development
The importance of information for the functioning
of the stock market is manifest. The whole notion
of market efficiency in its different forms is based
on how agents in the market react to information
and how information is eventually reflected into
prices. Graphs included in annual reports do not
provide additional information, but they are a ve-
hicle of information dissemination that makes data
more visible and, when properly constructed, fa-
cilitates its processing (Beattie and Jones, 1992).
Extant research, however, shows that a significant
proportion of graphs included by companies in
their annual reports is materially distorted, gener-
ally to portray corporate performance more
favourably7 (e.g. Mather et al., 1996; Beattie and
Jones, 1999). Researchers conclude that managers
use distorted graphs to manage users’ perceptions
(e.g. Beattie and Jones, 2000).
Experimental research provides evidence consis-
tent with this conclusion. Taylor and Anderson
(1986), Beattie and Jones (2002) and Arunachalam
et al. (2002) all provide evidence that users’ per-
ceptions are far more favourable when they are
based on graphs that are favourably distorted.
Arunachalam et al. (2002) explain this phenome-
non on the basis of two findings of psychological
research. First, Payne et al. (1993) show that peo-
ple minimise their cognitive effort in order to
achieve a certain level of accuracy. Second,
Ricketts (1990) finds that people have difficulty at
detecting presentation errors. Distorted graphs
usually do not reverse or fundamentally change the
reality as expressed by the data.
Participants’ perceptions are affected by distort-
ed graphs even when the accurate numeric values
are displayed as variable labels in graphs (e.g.
Arunachalam et al., 2002). This suggests that par-
ticipants focus their attention on the image por-
trayed in graphs and ignore the numeric values.
The fact that participants in these experimental
studies neglect relevant information could be at-
tributed to their low level of experience (they were
students). However, extant research provides evi-
dence showing that even sophisticated users (ana-
lysts) do not always make use of all available in-
formation.
A substantial body of research in theoretical 
finance demonstrates that, under certain circum-
stances, analysts may ignore a significant propor-
tion of their private information. Trueman (1994)
demonstrates that analysts tend to release forecasts
similar to those reported by other analysts, even
when their private information does not justify
such forecasts. Similarly, Morris and Shin (2002)
analyse the role of public information in contests
where an agent needs to co-ordinate with other
agents in order to maximise his/her payoff.8 They
show that, in these settings, it can be socially opti-
mal to adopt coarser information systems instead
of finer information systems. These theoretical
predictions have been confirmed empirically.
Stickel (1992), Graham (1999), Hong et al. (2000),
and Welch (2000) provide evidence of analysts’
herding behaviour and Anctil et al. (2004) use an
experimental setting to document the negative so-
cial effects of a lack of coordination.
Literature on limited attention provides empiri-
cal evidence showing that investors ignore valu-
able information when making investment
decisions. For instance, Doyle et al. (2003) find
that the stock market does not fully appreciate the
predictive power of expenses excluded from pro-
forma earnings. Similarly, Hirshleifer et al. (2004)
demonstrate that investors do not optimally use the
information conveyed by net operating assets
when assessing the sustainability of corporate per-
formance. Furthermore, experimental studies such
as those by Hopkins (1996), Hirst and Hopkins
(1998) and Hirst et al. (2004) show that analysts’
judgments and valuations are affected by the 
income-measurement method (recognition versus
disclosure in the footnotes) or the classification of
items in the financial statements. These studies
provide further evidence showing that even ex-
perts ignore relevant information when making 
estimations and valuations; otherwise their valua-
tions would not be affected by classification of in-
formation in financial statements. Overall, prior
research indicates that users tend to focus their at-
tention on the most salient and easily processed in-
formation, neglecting relevant data. This is
attributed to limited attention and cognitive pro-
cessing power (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).
Graphs represent a prominent piece of informa-
tion in the annual report and the information they
convey can be processed by users fairly easily.
Then, on the basis of both the theoretical argu-
ments and the empirical and experimental evidence
provided by extant literature, we hypothesise that
market expectations and analysts’ estimations can
be affected by favourable graph distortion, despite
the fact that accurate values of the variables dis-
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 85
7 Distortion refers to violations of what Tufte (1983) states
as an essential principle in graph construction: physical meas-
ures on the surface of the graph should be directly proportion-
al to the numerical quantities represented. The use of non-zero
axis, broken axis, or non-arithmetic scales leads to graphs
where equal distances along the axis do not represent equal
amounts, that is, physical measures are not proportional to the
underlying numerical values.
8 The stock market is used by Morris and Shin (2002) as an
example of such a contest.
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played in graphs are reflected in the financial state-
ments. The ex-ante (expected) measures of the
cost of equity capital depend directly on these ex-
pectations and estimations in the sense that more
optimistic forecasts about the future of the compa-
ny are associated with a lower level of the ex-ante
cost of capital. Hence, we state the following hy-
pothesis to be tested in our study:
H1: Favourable graph distortion is negatively
related to the ex-ante cost of equity capital.
Disclosure and time are two additional factors
that can affect the relationship between graph dis-
tortion and the cost of equity capital. Next, we dis-
cuss the moderating effect that can be exercised by
disclosure and afterwards we analyse the role
played by the passing of time in correcting biases
in ex-ante expectations.
The above-mentioned prior experimental re-
search indicates that users have difficulties in de-
tecting graph distortion. Corporate disclosure can
ameliorate this situation by providing users with
additional data that may turn out to be important
clues in identifying distorted graphs.9 Take, for ex-
ample, the case of a firm presenting a slight in-
crease in net sales, which is magnified in a
distorted graph so that it appears as a strong rising
trend. Distortion is difficult to detect because the
direction of the change depicted graphically is the
same as that shown by data in financial statements.
However, if this firm provides operating data
showing a decrease in production, readers are
more likely to realise the graph is distorted. The
role played by disclosure in correcting mispercep-
tions is documented in the literature. Schrand and
Walther (2000) observe that the bias introduced by
strategic choices of prior-period benchmarks in
earnings announcements is eliminated when the fi-
nancial statements are released. Along the same
line, in a controlled experiment, Krische (2005)
finds that clear and quantitative information about
prior-period transitory gains or losses allows par-
ticipants to adjust the comparative prior period-
earnings stated as a benchmark in earnings
announcements. Based on prior evidence we ex-
pect that the likelihood of distortion being detect-
ed is increasing in the level of disclosure.
Detection of graph distortion can have an impact
on users’ decisions because of the impairment in
corporate disclosure credibility. As stated by
Schmid (1992), graph distortion threatens the
credibility of the entire report containing such a
graphic. Therefore, when distortion is detected,
users may perceive a higher risk associated with
their decisions.10 Theoretical studies by Easley and
O’Hara (2004) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2005)
predict the existence of a negative relationship be-
tween the quality of information and the risk pre-
mium required by investors. Easley and O’Hara
(2004) show that information precision reduces
the information-based systematic risk of shares to
uninformed investors, thereby reducing the cost of
capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) take a differ-
ent approach and show that information quality 
increases expected cash-flows and, as a conse-
quence, reduces the firms’ cost of capital. Francis
et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005) provide em-
pirical evidence supporting these predictions.
They find that accrual quality and a number of
earnings attributes are significantly related to the
cost of capital. By analogy we expect that, by 
reducing the credibility of the annual report, the
inclusion of distorted graphs, if detected, will in-
crease the information risk and, as a consequence,
the risk premium demanded by investors. On the
contrary, as long as distortion is undetected, com-
panies could benefit from a lower cost of equity.
Since the overall level of disclosure can be essen-
tial in unveiling graph distortion, we test the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H2: The effect of favourable graph distortion on
the ex-ante cost of equity capital is different
at low levels of disclosure than at high 
levels of disclosure.
So far we have focused our attention on users’
perceptions and estimations about the future of the
company. These perceptions and estimations are at
the basis of the so called ex-ante measures of the
cost of equity. After estimations have been formed
and revealed, investors will take their buying and
selling decisions in the stock market and market
prices will be formed continuously. The EMH pre-
dicts that market prices reflect all available infor-
mation in an efficient manner. Hence, it could be
argued that graph usage and graph distortion
should not affect the aggregated ex-post behaviour
of the stock market. In other words, as time pass-
es, the aggregation role played by market activity
should correct any possible bias contained in the
ex-ante perceptions and estimations.
In a paper closely related to our analysis, Easton
and Sommers (2007) provide evidence showing
that ex-ante measures of the cost of equity are up-
wards biased because of the bias contained in ana-
lysts’ forecasts. However, they also show that the
86 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 The relationship between the overall level of disclosure
and the cost of equity has already been explored in various pa-
pers, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view.
For a general introduction to this literature see Botosan
(2006). A more analytical perspective can be found in
Verrecchia (2001) and Dye (2001).
10 Prior research referring to managers’ explanations for
poor performance supports this line of reasoning. Barton and
Mercer (2005) find that implausible explanations harm man-
agement reputation leading to an increase in the firm’s infor-
mation risk. Although these explanations are given to promote
a more favourable view of corporate performance, they end up
having the contrary effect.
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stock market undoes the bias of analysts’ forecasts.
Hence, these authors suggest that variation in the
proxies used to measure the ex-ante cost of equity
capital can be due to variation in analysts’ bias
rather than to variation in the true cost of equity
capital. Starting from this result, we conjecture
that the bias in analysts’ estimations of earnings
per share (the base for the ex-ante measure of the
cost of equity) can be influenced by graph distor-
tion, while the ex-post realised cost of equity is
not. In other words, stock prices are not biased by
distorted graphs. This argument is the basis of our
third hypothesis.
H3: Favourable graph distortion does not affect
stock market returns, i.e. the ex-post cost of
equity capital.
Taken together, our three research hypotheses
aim at covering some important aspects of the po-
tential role played by graphs as communication
tools in the stock market. In the next section we
implement our research design by describing the
sample and the variables used for our empirical
tests.
3. Research design and variable definitions
3.1. The sample
For our sample we collect information on com-
panies listed on the continuous (electronic) market
in the MSE for the period 1996–2002. Information
on the graphs and their characteristics is gathered
from corporate annual reports. Data on the infor-
mation disclosed by the company (disclosure
index) is obtained from the rankings produced by
a pool of analysts and published annually by the
business magazine Actualidad Económica.11
Analysts’ forecasts and market data used to calcu-
late the cost of equity capital measures are ob-
tained from the JCF database.12 Finally, financial
data are collected from the OSIRIS database.13
Companies were removed from our study when
the necessary information was not available at
least for two consecutive years. Our final sample
comprises 259 firm-year observations from 
67 companies during 1996–2002.
3.2. Definition of variables
3.2.1. Cost of capital measures
Ex-ante cost of capital (RPEG_PREM)
An ex-ante measure of cost of equity capital is a
measure based on some valuation model and it in-
fers the discount rate that it should have been used
to calculate the observed price of the stock if that
particular valuation model had been used. The
question of which is the best proxy for the ex-ante
cost of equity capital of a company has received a
great deal of attention in the recent literature. To
produce a comprehensive review of this literature
is beyond the scope of this study. However, one of
the common results of these studies is that all the
measures proposed in the literature are highly cor-
related among each other. Consequently, the
choice of a particular proxy instead of another
should not have a major effect on the overall re-
sults of the study. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) as-
sess the relative merits of five alternative proxies
in terms of their association with credible risk
proxies. They find that the measure proposed by
Easton (2004) is one of the two measures that
clearly dominate the other three. They observe that
it correlates with a number of risk indicators in the
expected direction. This result, combined with the
relative simplicity of this measure, made us decide
to use it as our primary proxy for the ex-ante cost
of equity capital.14 Following Easton (2004) we
calculate the ex-ante cost of equity capital for year
t as15
where:
P0 = price of the stock of the company at 30 June
of year t+1
eps1 = one year ahead consensus forecast of earn-
ings per share at 30 June of year t+1
eps2 = two years ahead consensus forecast of
earnings per share at 30 June of year t+1
Following Botosan and Plumlee (2005) we then
calculate the equity risk premium (RPEG_PREM) by
subtracting from the cost of equity capital the risk
free rate, proxied by the interest rate on five-year
Spanish Treasury bills.16 To avoid an unduly effect
of outliers, RPEG_PREM is then winsorised at the 
1 and 99 percentiles of its distribution (i.e. values
in the top and bottom 1% of the distribution are set
equal to next value counting inwards from the ex-
tremes).
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 87
11 The process of elaboration of this index is similar to that
followed in constructing the AIMR index and it is discussed in
detail in Section 3.2.3.
12 JCF provides a global database of consensus earnings es-
timates and other financial projections to the professional in-
vestment community.
13 The OSIRIS database, compiled by Bureau Van Dijk, pro-
vides financials for the world’s publicly quoted companies
from over 130 countries. It has been used in prior studies (e.g.
García Lara et al., 2007; Surroca and Tribó, 2008). After com-
paring a number of databases, including OSIRIS, García Lara
et al. (2006) conclude that when using the same set of compa-
nies results are not affected by the choice of the database.
14 We check the robustness of our results to the use of other
proxies for the ex-ante cost of equity. Results of these sensitiv-
ity analyses are discussed in Section 4.2.1.
15 For the exact derivation of the formula the reader can
refer to Easton (2004).
16 We subtract the risk-free rate to obtain an indicator of the
premium for risk required by investors to fund the company.
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Ex-post cost of capital (stock returns)
Besides the ex-ante measure of the cost of equity,
we use the one-factor asset-pricing model to assess
the actual effect of graphs on the aggregated 
market.17 Similar to Francis et al. (2005), when
analysing the effect of accruals quality in stock re-
turns, we add a variable capturing the level of
graph distortion to the traditional capital asset pric-
ing model (CAPM). To obtain this graph distortion
factor we use a similar procedure to that employed
by Fama and French (1993) in constructing the size
and book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolios.
We start by constructing two mimicking portfolios
for graph distortion. To obtain these portfolios we
divide stocks into two groups: distorting and non-
distorting companies. Distorting companies are
those which materially distort the graphs included
in their annual reports to portray a more favourable
view of the company.18 Non-distorting companies
are those that present fairly constructed graphs or
distorted graphs presenting a more unfavourable
view of the company. We calculate monthly excess
returns for companies in each group from June of
year t+1 to May of year t+2.19 The graph distortion
factor mimicking portfolio equals mean monthly
excess return for distorting companies portfolio
less mean monthly excess return for non-distorting
companies portfolio. For our sample period
(1996–2002) we obtain a series of 84 monthly re-
turns for the graph distortion factor. Then, we esti-
mate the CAPM including the graph distortion
factor for each of the 67 companies included in our
sample. In these regressions, the coefficient of the
graph distortion factor indicates whether this factor
adds to market risk premium in explaining returns,
our proxy for the ex-post cost of equity.
The ex-ante and ex-post measures of the cost of
equity differ not only in the nature of the informa-
tion on which they are based (analysts’ forecasts as
opposed to realised returns), but also in the period
of time when they are formed. The relationship be-
tween the ex-ante and the ex-post measure of the
cost of equity capital in terms of time is represent-
ed in Figure 1.
As we can see, the ex-ante measure is based on
analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share one and
two years ahead at 30 June of year t+1, whereas
the ex-post measure is based on realised returns
(i.e. we estimate firm-specific asset-pricing mod-
els running from June 1997 to May 2004). For the
period June of year t+1 to May of year t+2, returns
88 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
Ex-ante and ex-post cost of equity
Panel A: Ex-ante cost of equity
Panel B: Ex-post cost of equity
Annual report
Annual report
17 Similar results obtain when using the three-factor model
proposed by Fama and French (1993).
18 Material distortion refers to a mean favourable graph dis-
tortion index above 2.5%. The selection of this cut-off point is
explained in detail in Section 3.2.2, when describing the meas-
ure of graph distortion. The direction of the results remains
unchanged if distorting and non-distorting portfolios include
companies in the top and bottom 40% percentiles of the distri-
bution of the variable used to measure graph distortion, re-
spectively.
19Following prior literature on disclosure in Spain (e.g.
Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007), calculations start in June of
year t+1, given that financial reporting regulation in Spain re-
quires companies to release their annual report by that date at
the latest.
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to the graph distortion factor incorporated in the
asset pricing models are calculated using the level
of graph distortion in the annual report of year t.
Then, when using the ex-ante measure of the cost
of equity, the analysis of the effect of graph distor-
tion is based on expectations observed at a certain
point time (June of year t+1). However, when em-
ploying the ex-post measure, the analysis is based
on monthly realised returns covering one year
(from June of year t+1 to May of year t+2).
Accordingly, the latter measure allows for two
types of corrections: those arising from the aggre-
gation of all investors’ decisions and those result-
ing from the passing of time which permits new
information to be impounded in stock prices.
3.2.2. Graph distortion measures
Relative graph discrepancy (RGD) index
Graph distortion is measured in our study by using
the relative graph discrepancy (RGD) index
(Mather et al.,2005),20 which is defined as
where g2 represents the actual height of the last
column and g3 is the proportionately correct height
of the last column, based on the formula:
d1 = value of first data point (corresponding to
the first column)
d2 = value of last data point (corresponding to
the last column)
g1 = actual height of first column
g2 = actual height of last column.
In the absence of distortion, the index takes the
value of zero (0), that is, the change portrayed in
the graph is the same as that observed in the data.
The RGD takes a positive value both when an in-
creasing trend is exaggerated and when a decreas-
ing trend is understated. Negative values result
from understatement of increasing trends and ex-
aggeration of decreasing trends (Table 1, Panel A).
Measures of favourable and unfavourable graph
distortion
The RGD index gives us an indication of the level
of distortion of a particular graph, either if distor-
tion is favourable or unfavourable to the firm. To
test our hypotheses we need to isolate those distor-
tions that are favourable to the company and design
an indicator of favourable (unfavourable) graph
distortion across all graphs in the annual report.
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 89
Table 1
Measures of graph distortion
Panel A: Distortion measure for individual graphs
Trend in data Nature of distortion RGD
Increasing Exaggeration >0
Decreasing Understatement >0
Increasing Understatement <0
Decreasing Exaggeration <0
Panel B: Distortion measure across all graphs in the annual report
Graphs in the annual report RGDFAV RGDUNF
All graphs are properly constructed 0 0
There are favourably distorted graphs
>0 >0There are unfavourably distorted graphs
There are favourably distorted graphs
>0 0There is not any unfavourably distorted graph
There is not any favourably distorted graph 0 >0There are unfavourably distorted graphs
20 This measure was developed by Mather et al. (2005) to
overcome some of the limitations of the graph discrepancy
index (GDI), the measure of graph distortion used in previous
studies. The GDI is defined as a–b –1100, where a is the per-
centage of change in centimetres depicted in the graph and b is
the percentage of change in the data. We repeated all our analy-
sis using the GDI, instead of the RGD, and results do not vary.
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Favourably distorted graphs are those graphs
manipulated to present a more favourable view of
the company. Examples of favourable distortion
are the magnification of a positive trend in sales
growth or the understatement of a decreasing trend
in the same variable. Conversely, understatement
of an increasing trend in sales and exaggeration of
a decreasing trend in this variable are examples of
unfavourable distortion.
We measure the level of favourable distortion
across all graphs included by a firm in the annual
report as follows:
nj=1 |rgd favj|RGDFAV = –––––––––––
n
where:
|rgd favj| = Absolute value of the RGD index for
graph j in the annual report.21 rgd favj is set to zero
when graph j is distorted to portray a more un-
favourable view of the company.
n = total number of graphs in the annual report.
The RGDFAV provides us with an indication of
the mean level of favourable graph distortion in
the annual report. This measure is increasing in the
number of favourably distorted graphs and the cor-
responding RGD indices. Zero (0) value for the
RGDFAV indicates that the annual report does not
contain any favourably distorted graph. Panel B in
Table 1 describes the values that correspond to the
RGDFAV measure depending on whether the an-
nual report includes properly constructed,
favourably, and unfavourably distorted graphs.
Similarly, we measure unfavourable graph dis-
tortion across all graphs in the annual report as fol-
lows:
nj=1 |rgd unfj|RGDUNF = –––––––––––
n
where:
|rgd unfj| = Absolute value of the RGD index for
graph j in the annual report. rgd unfj is set to zero
when graph j is distorted to portray a more
favourable view of the company.
The RGDUNF is increasing in the number and
the RGD of distorted graphs presenting a more un-
favourable image of the company and takes the
value of zero (0) when the annual report does not
include any unfavourably distorted graph (Table 1,
Panel B).
We also calculate mean favourable distortion
index for financial (RGDFFAV) and non-financial
graphs (RGDRFAV). These indices are defined in
the same way as the RGDFAV but taking into con-
sideration exclusively financial graphs (i.e. graphs
depicting financial variables) for the RGDFFAV
and non-financial graphs for the RGDRFAV.
In estimating the regression models we use the
fractional ranks of our graph distortion measures
(RGDFAV, RGDUNF, RGDFFAV and RGDR-
FAV). Fractional ranks for each of these measures
are computed by dividing, within each year, the
rank of a firm’s distortion measure by the number
of firms in the sample in this year. The rank is in-
creasing in the level of distortion.
Finally, in order to distinguish between material-
ly and non-materially distorted graphs we have to
choose a cut-off point for the RGD measure.
Mather et al. (2005) conclude that an RGD of
2.5% would be similar to a GDI of 5%, the cut-off
point suggested by Tufte (1983) and used in previ-
ous studies. This is why we decided to use the
2.5% cut-off point as suggested by Mather et al.
(2005).22
3.2.3. Control variables
Following prior literature, we add a number of
risk factors as controls in our regression models
(i.e. number of analysts’ estimations, beta, lever-
age, book-to-price ratio, volatility of profitability,
growth, and disclosure). These factors are standard
controls in the cost of equity literature, which
widely documents their association with measures
of the cost of equity (e.g. Gebhardt et al., 2001;
Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Francis et al., 2008).
Number of estimates (NEST)
In order to proxy for the level of attention received
by a company we use the number of analysts’ esti-
mations of one-year-ahead EPS. This is a standard
control variable used in disclosure-related studies.
Starting from the seminal work by Botosan (1997),
the previous literature has documented a strong in-
fluence of the level of analysts’ attention on the re-
lationship between disclosure and cost of equity
capital.
Beta (BETA)
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) predicts a
positive association between the market beta of a
stock and its cost of capital. However, previous
studies do not consistently show such an expected
relationship. While Botosan (1997) or Hail (2002)
confirm the expected positive sign, Gebhardt et al.
(2001) observe the expected sign but beta loses its
significance when they add their industry measure.
Finally, Francis et al. (2005) observe a negative re-
lationship between beta and their measure of the
cost of equity. We obtain the beta of each stock
using a market model for the 60 months prior to
90 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
21 As we are interested in obtaining an indicator of the level
of distortion, absolute values are used in order to avoid the off-
setting of positive and negative values of the individual
RGD’s.
22 The direction of the results does not change when we use
a GDI of 10% as the cut-off point. This level of distortion was
found to affect users’ perceptions in the study by Beattie and
Jones (2002).
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June of t+1, requiring, at least, 12 monthly return
observations.
Leverage (LEV)
We measure leverage as the ratio between long-
term debt and the market value of equity at 
31 December of year t. Modigliani and Miller
(1958) predict that the cost of equity should be in-
creasing in the amount of debt in the financial
structure of the company. This prediction is sup-
ported by results of studies such as those by
Gebhardt et al. (2001) or Botosan and Plumlee
(2005). In line with previous literature we expect
to find a positive relationship between leverage
and the cost of equity capital.
Book-to-price ratio (BP)
This is the ratio between book value of equity and
market value of equity at 31 December of year t.
Prior research documents a positive association
between the book-to-price ratio and average re-
alised returns (e.g. Fama and French, 1993 and
Davis et al., 2000) as well as different ex-ante
measures of the cost of equity (e.g. Gebhardt et al.,
2001 and Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). These re-
sults are interpreted as evidence that the book-to-
price ratio proxies for risk.
Volatility of profitability (V_NI)
Based on practitioners’ consideration of the vari-
ability of earnings, Gebhardt et al. (2001) argue
that this variable can be regarded as a source of
risk. In our study, the volatility of the profitability
of the firm is calculated as the standard deviation
of net income scaled by mean of net income over
a period of five years ending at December of year t.
Growth (GROWTH)
Following Francis et al. (2005) we control for the
recent growth experienced by the company meas-
ured as the log of 1 plus the percentage change in
the book value of equity along year t.
Disclosure (RINDEX)
Finally, to test whether there is an interaction be-
tween graph distortion and disclosure (H2), we in-
troduce a measure of overall corporate disclosure.
The relationship between corporate disclosure and
the cost of equity is widely documented in the lit-
erature (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Espinosa
and Trombetta, 2007; Francis et al., 2008). As 
an indicator of the information provided by the
company we use the disclosure index published
annually by the business magazine Actualidad
Económica. This index is based on the information
disclosed by companies in their annual reports.
These reports are reviewed by the panel of experts
who assign a score to a list of information items.
For each company, the scores for each item are
then added up to obtain a global score intended to
represent the disclosure policy of the entity.
Finally, the disclosure index is calculated as the
ratio between the actual score of the company and
the maximum possible score. Similar to Botosan
and Plumlee (2002) or Nikolaev and Van Lent
(2005), we use fractional ranks of the annual re-
port indexes. Firms are ranked from 1 to N for
each year and then the rank of each firm is divid-
ed by the total number of firms in this year to ob-
tain the fractional ranks.
Table 2 provides a summary of the definition
and data source of variables used in our analyses.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3,
where it can be seen that companies in our sample
make wide use of graphs in their annual reports. At
least one graph is included by 92% of the compa-
nies and the mean number of graphs per annual re-
port (GRAPH) is 16. These figures are similar to
those observed for other countries (e.g. Beattie and
Jones, 2001). Although not reported in Table 3,
mean RGDFAV is higher than 2.5% for 38% of the
companies included in our study; that is, more than
one third of the companies in our sample have
favourably distorted the graphs included in their
annual reports above the cut-off point chosen as 
an indication of material distortion. Unfavourable
distortions are less frequent; mean RGDUNF is
higher than 2.5% for 11% of the companies in our
sample.
The correlation matrix presented in Table 4
shows that our ex-ante measure of the cost of eq-
uity is significantly correlated with all the risk
proxies included in our study. As expected, the
cost of equity is positively related to beta, book-to-
price ratio, leverage and earnings variability and
negatively related to growth and the number of es-
timates that acts also as a proxy for corporate size.
Table 4 also shows a significant negative correla-
tion between the cost of equity and our indicators
of graph distortion.
4.2. Multivariate analysis
4.2.1. Ex-ante measure of the cost of equity
(RPEG_PREM)
This section presents the results obtained for the
ex-ante measure of the cost of equity (i.e. the
RPEG measure as developed by Easton, 2004). To
asses the validity of this measure, we start our
analysis by estimating a model similar to that de-
veloped by Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and used
to test the relation between the cost of capital and
a number of indicators of firm risk. We estimate
the following equation:
RPREM it+1 = αi + β1 NESTit + β2LEVit (1)
+ β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit
+ β6 GROWTHit + eit,
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 91
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Table 2
Definition of variables
Variables Definitions and data source
Dependent variables
RPEG_PREM Estimated risk premium calculated as the RPEG in Easton (2004) less the risk-free rate
(source JCF database).
RPEF_PREM Estimated risk premium calculated as the RPEF in Easton and Monahan (2005) less the
risk-free rate (source JCF database).
RMPEG_PREM Estimated risk premium calculated as the RMPEG in Easton (2004) less the risk-free rate
(source JCF database).
RAVRG_PREM Estimated risk premium calculated as the average of RPEF, RPEG, and RMPEG less the risk-
free rate (source JCF database).
Rjm – Rfm Monthly excess return for firm j (source JCF database).
Independent variables
GRAPH Total number of graphs in the annual report of year t (source corporate annual reports).
RRGDFAV Fractional rank of RGDFAV. RGDFAV is mean favourable Relative Graph Discrepancy
(RGD) index across all graphs in the annual report. This index measures graph distortion
and (0) means no distortion or distortion that is unfavourable to the company (source cor-
porate annual reports).
RRGDUNF Fractional rank of RGDUNF. RGDUNF is mean unfavourable Relative Graph
Discrepancy (RGD) index across all graphs in the annual report. This index measures
graph distortion and (0) means no distortion or distortion that is favourable to the compa-
ny (source corporate annual reports).
RRGDFFAV Fractional rank of RGDFFAV. RGDFFAV is mean favourable RGD of financial graphs
(source corporate annual reports).
RRGDRFAV Fractional rank of RGDRFAV. RGDRFAV is mean unfavourable RGD of non-financial
graphs (source corporate annual reports).
RMm – Rfm Monthly excess return on the market portfolio (source JCF database).
RGDFAVfactorm Return to the graph distortion factor mimicking portfolio (source JCF database).
Control variables
NEST Number of analysts’ estimations of one-year-ahead EPS (source JCF database).
BETA Capital market beta estimated via the market model with a minimum of 12 monthly re-
turns over the 60 months prior to June of year t+1 (source JCF database).
BP Book value of equity scaled by market value of equity (source OSIRIS database).
LEV Long-term debt scaled by market value of equity (source OSIRIS database).
V_NI Standard deviation of net income scaled by mean net income over a period of five years
ending at December of year t (source OSIRIS database) .
GROWTH Log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity along year t (source
OSIRIS database).
ROA Return on total assets (source OSIRIS database).
CDA Current discretionary accruals estimated by using the model developed by Dechow and
Dichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002) (source OSIRIS database).
RINDEX Fractional rank of the disclosure index prepared by the business magazine Actualidad
Económica for year t (source business magazine Actualidad Económica).
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where:
RPREM = Proxy for the equity risk premium = RPEG
– Rf
Rf = the risk-free rate, proxied by the interest rate
on five-year Spanish Treasury bills.
The rest of the variables are defined in Table 2.
We estimate all our models using the fixed ef-
fects technique. The importance of using proper
panel data estimation techniques when dealing
with financial pooled data has been stressed by
Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) and Petersen
(2005). If a simple OLS method is used to com-
pute the estimated coefficients, their significance
is very likely to be overstated. A traditional way to
correct for this problem is to estimate yearly 
regressions and then take the average of the esti-
mated coefficients, evaluating the statistical signif-
icance of these estimates by using the
Fama-Macbeth t-statistic. This corrects for cross-
sectional dependence, but not for time depend-
ence. Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) show how
important firm effects can be when studying cost
of capital determinants for a pooled sample of
companies. This is our reason for estimating our
model by using the fixed effects technique.23
Results of estimating equation (1) are presented
in Table 5, Panel B (Model 1). The coefficients of
the number of estimates, leverage, and variability
of profitability have the expected sign and are sta-
tistically significant. The fact that the coefficients
of beta and the book-to-price ratio are not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero could be due
to the use of the fixed effect estimation technique.
Beta and the book-to-price are risk factors that are
specific for each company. Given that with the
adopted estimation technique a specific intercept
is estimated for each company, it is highly likely
that the effect of these variables is already cap-
tured by these constants. Overall, our results con-
firm those already obtained for the Spanish market
by Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) and support the
validity of the measure of the cost of equity capi-
tal and the choice of the control variables.
We now move on to the main part of our empir-
ical study and insert in our specification the indi-
cators of mean favourable and unfavourable graph
distortion across all graphs included in the annual
report. Specifically, we now estimate the following
equation (Model 2):
RPREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit (2)
+ β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit
+ β6 GROWTHit + β7 RRGDFAVit
+ β8 RRGDUNFit + εit
All variables are defined in Table 2.
We now find that favourable graph distortion is
significantly and negatively related to the ex-ante
measure of the cost of equity. A negative coeffi-
cient is also observed for unfavourable graph dis-
tortion but results show that it is insignificantly
different from zero. These results suggest that
favourably distorted graphs introduce a bias on
users’ perceptions. According to our results, annu-
al report users perceive a better image of corporate
performance when the annual report includes
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 93
Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc.
RPEG_PREM 5.972 4.448 –0.693 25.031 3.134 5.128 7.682
NEST 15.927 9.103 1 40 9 16 21
BETA 1.125 0.549 0.034 4.594 0.773 1.038 1.348
BP 0.637 0.403 0.049 3.018 0.362 0.558 0.818
LEV 0.398 0.603 0 6.315 0.065 0.221 0.469
V_NI 0.579 1.646 –2.670 19.930 0.180 0.320 0.558
GROWTH 0.103 0.235 –1.769 1.515 0.013 0.079 0.148
GRAPH 16.087 15.461 0 84 4.25 12 23
RGDFAV 0.106 0.307 0 3.685 0 0 0.095
RGDUNF 0.012 0.062 0 0.878 0 0 0
RGDFFAV 0.108 0.326 0 3.685 0 0 0.068
RGDRFAV 0.043 0.151 0 1.5 0 0 0
ROA 6.273 5.820 –21.190 28.100 2.680 5.145 8.150
CDA 0.021 0.065 –0.318 0.238 –0.011 0.017 0.048
INDEX 0.637 0.150 0.230 0.960 0.550 0.630 0.750
The sample consists of 259 firm-year observations for the period 1996–2002. The definition of variables is pro-
vided in Table 2.
23 However, at least for our main analysis, we also provide
the results obtained by running an OLS regression on the
pooled sample. These results can be found in Table 4, Panel A.
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graphs that have been distorted to portray a more
favourable view of the company. The same is true
if we focus our attention only on financial graphs
(RRGDFFAV), as we do in Model 3. These results
support our hypothesis H1. The information repre-
sented in graphs is usually included in the financial
statements or other parts of the annual report.
However, users get a different picture of the com-
pany when the annual report includes favourably
distorted graphs. These results are consistent with
the experimental evidence of the impact of im-
properly constructed graphs on subjects’ choices
provided by Arunachalam et al. (2002). They ob-
serve that students’ decisions are affected by graph
design. We extend these results by showing that, 
in a real setting, experts’ (analysts’) forecasts are
biased because of distorted graphs included in 
annual reports.
We test the robustness of these results to the
choice of the ex-ante measure of the cost of equity
and to the inclusion of additional control variables.
As for the proxy for the cost of equity, we calcu-
late two alternative measures: RPEF and RMPEG. The
definition of these measures is given in the appen-
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Table 5
Regression of the ex-ante measure of cost of equity (RPEG_PREM) on risk proxies and graph distortion
Model 1: RPEG_PREM it+1 = αi + β1 NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit + εit
Model 2: RPEG_PREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β7 RRGDFAVit + β8 RRGDUNFit + εit
Model 3: RPEG_PREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β9 RRGDFFAVit + β10RRGDRFAVit + εit
Panel A: Pooled OLS regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
Intercept 4.382 0.000 4.936 0.000 5.101 0.000
NEST –0.059 0.039 –0.051 0.091 –0.057 0.064
LEV 1.149 0.128 1.122 0.145 1.136 0.143
V_NI 0.096 0.325 0.075 0.435 0.083 0.403
BETA 0.791 0.149 0.892 0.105 0.895 0.096
BP 2.089 0.010 2.111 0.010 2.053 0.011
GROWTH –2.172 0.087 –2.131 0.097 –1.839 0.160
RRGDFAV –1.721 0.072
RRGDUNF 0.162 0.900
RRGDFFAV –2.604 0.005
RRGDRFAV 0.910 0.530
Adj. R2 0.135 0.138 0.149
Panel B. Fixed effects regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
NEST –0.147 0.011 –0.130 0.027 –0.126 0.032
LEV 2.537 0.004 2.491 0.005 2.516 0.005
V_NI 0.264 0.022 0.270 0.021 0.279 0.018
BETA –0.378 0.453 –0.271 0.593 –0.293 0.567
BP –0.109 0.912 –0.127 0.897 –0.182 0.851
GROWTH 0.160 0.867 0.208 0.831 0.296 0.766
RRGDFAV –2.351 0.013
RRGDUNF –0.182 0.828
RRGDFFAV –2.230 0.015
RRGDRFAV –1.032 0.260
Adj. R2 0.547 0.554 0.555
The sample consists of 259 firm-year observations for the period 1996–2002. The definition of variables is pro-
vided in Table 2. Estimates of the firm-specific constant terms are omitted for readability.
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dix. We also use the average (RAVRG) of the three
proxies calculated in our study. Additionally, we
check if our results are driven by factors such as
corporate performance or accruals quality. Prior
literature documents a positive association be-
tween corporate performance and graph distortion
(e.g. Beattie and Jones, 1999, 2000). Therefore,
the effect of graph distortion on the cost of equity
that we observe in this study could be driven by
the fact that distorting companies are also those
with the highest performance. Hence, we add a
measure of corporate performance (i.e. ROA) as a
control variable. Second, Francis et al. (2005) and
Francis et al. (2008) show the existence of a posi-
tive relationship between the cost of equity capital
and the (poor) quality of accruals. The negative re-
lationship between graph distortion and the cost of
equity observed in this study could be reflecting
this association. Therefore, we test for the robust-
ness of our results by adding a measure of accruals
quality (i.e. discretionary accruals) to our model
(CDA).24
Table 6 reports the results of these sensitivity
analyses and shows that the effect of favourable
graph distortion on the ex-ante cost of equity is ro-
bust to the choice of the measure of the cost of eq-
uity. Favourable graph distortion is found to be
negatively and significantly related to all the alter-
native measures of the ex-ante cost of equity cal-
culated in our study. Additionally, we observe that,
although corporate performance and accruals qual-
ity can be highly significant variables in explain-
ing the ex-ante cost of equity, its inclusion in the
model does not qualitatively change our results.
That is, the effect of favourable graph distortion on
the ex-ante measures of the cost of equity remains.
Interaction analysis
To investigate whether the relationship between
graph distortion and the ex-ante measure of the
cost of equity varies depending on the overall level
of disclosure, as stated in our second hypothesis,
we introduce a measure of the voluntary informa-
tion provided by the company in their annual re-
port (RINDEX) and an interaction term between
disclosure and graph distortion. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
RPREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit (3)
+ β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β7 RRGDFAVit + β8 RINDEXit
+ β9 RRGDFAVit * RINDEXit + εit
All variables are defined in Table 2.
Table 7, Panel A presents the results of the esti-
mation of Equation (3). Consistent with the results
reported previously, the coefficient on RRGDFAV
is found to be negative and significant. A negative
relationship is also observed between the overall
level of disclosure and the cost of equity, although
it is not significant at conventional levels. Finally,
the interaction term is positive and significant,
which means that graph distortion and disclosure
interact in shaping their effects on the cost of equi-
ty. Since the sign of the interaction term is posi-
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Table 6
Regression of the cost of equity on risk proxies and graph distortion using fixed effects
RPREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit + β7 RRGDFAVit
+ β9 ROAit + β10CDAit + εit
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
RPEG_PREM RPEF_PREM RMPEG_PREM RAVRG_PREM
Variable Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
NEST –0.121 0.029 –0.177 0.000 –0.085 0.111 –0.125 0.003
LEV 1.590 0.075 1.032 0.071 1.847 0.046 1.410 0.021
V_NI 0.168 0.280 –0.020 0.800 0.082 0.578 0.094 0.314
BETA –0.454 0.350 –1.191 0.012 –0.689 0.193 –0.892 0.049
BP 0.510 0.701 0.971 0.253 0.774 0.573 0.692 0.451
GROWTH 1.082 0.287 0.748 0.299 1.150 0.283 0.726 0.307
RRGDFAV –2.232 0.012 –1.327 0.041 –2.645 0.002 –2.296 0.001
ROA –0.334 0.000 –0.037 0.378 –0.327 0.000 –0.172 0.000
CDA 3.090 0.277 5.413 0.010 5.793 0.049 5.296 0.014
Adj. R2 0.630 0.599 0.653 0.659
The sample consists of 259 firm-year observations for the period 1996–2002. The definition of variables is pro-
vided in Table 2. Estimates of the firm-specific constant terms are omitted for readability.
24 To obtain this measure we use the model developed by
Dechow and Dichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002).
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tive, results indicate that the effect of graph distor-
tion on the cost of equity is moderated by the level
of overall disclosure. Stated in other words, the ef-
fect of graph distortion on the cost of equity is par-
tially (or eventually completely) offset by its
interaction with the overall level of disclosure. To
get a clearer picture of the interaction between
graph distortion and disclosure we dichotomise the
RINDEX variable and estimate the following
equation:
RPREM it+1 = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit (4)
+ β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β7 RRGDFAVit + β8 RINDEX_Dit
+ β9 RRGDFAVit * RINDEX_Dit + εit
where all the variables are defined as before except
for:
RINDEX_D = A dichotomy variable which, in
Panel B (C), takes the value of one (1) when the
value of the RINDEX is in the top 50% (33%) per-
centile of the distribution of this variable, and a
value of zero (0) otherwise.
Results of this estimation are presented in Table
7, Panels B and C. Since the selection of the cut-
off point used to dichotomise the RINDEX vari-
able is arbitrary, Table 7 reports the results
obtained by using two different cut-off points. In
panel B, the set of high disclosers comprises those
companies the disclosure index of which is above
the median, while in Panel C high disclosers are
those firms falling in the top 33% percentile of the
distribution of the RINDEX variable.
Consistent with the results presented in Panel A,
we find that the cost of equity is negatively associ-
ated with RRGDFAV and positively related to the
interaction term. The dichotomisation of the vari-
able RINDEX facilitates the interpretation of the
results. When RINDEX_D takes the value of zero
(0), the relationship between graph distortion and
the cost of equity is given by β7 and is negative,
both in Panels B and C. This means that for low
disclosers, graph distortion is negatively related to
the cost of equity. However, when RINDEX_D
takes the value of one (1), the effect of graph dis-
tortion is given by the addition of the coefficients
on RRGDFAV and the interaction term (i.e. β7 +β9). This addition results in a negative figure(–0.413) in Panel B, which is much lower than the
coefficient on RRGDFAV, and a positive figure
(0.962) in Panel C. Thus, for transparent compa-
nies, disclosure partially removes the effect of
graph distortion (Panel B) or even transforms it
into a positive effect (Panel C). These results indi-
cate that disclosure moderates the relationship be-
tween graph distortion and the cost of equity and
provide support for our second hypothesis.
Furthermore, differences between Panels B and C
indicate that the moderating effect is increasing in
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 97
Table 7
Regression of the cost of equity on risk proxies, graph distortion, and disclosure using fixed effects
Model 1: RPEG_PREM it+1 (Panel A) = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β7 RRGDFAVit + β8 RINDEXit + β9 RRGDFAVit * RINDEXit + εit
Model 2: RPEG_PREM it+1 (Panels B–C) = αi + β1NESTit + β2LEVit + β3 V_NIit + β4 BETAit + β5 BPit + β6 GROWTHit
+ β7 RRGDFAVit + β8 RINDEX_Dit + β9 RRGDFAVit * RINDEX_Dit + εit
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Variable Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
NEST –0.148 0.032 –0.148 0.028 –0.153 0.022
LEV 2.433 0.001 2.456 0.001 2.495 0.001
V_NI 0.284 0.050 0.266 0.066 0.276 0.058
BETA –0.350 0.555 –0.345 0.564 –0.161 0.786
BP –0.202 0.829 –0.147 0.876 –0.135 0.885
GROWTH 0.181 0.856 0.111 0.911 0.237 0.809
RRGDFAV –6.227 0.002 –4.198 0.003 –3.909 0.002
RINDEX –4.204 0.099
RRGDFAV*RINDEX 8.106 0.024
RINDEX_D –1.517 0.178 –2.093 0.143
RRGDFAV*RINDEX_D 3.785 0.058 4.871 0.028
Adj. R2 0.564 0.561 0.565
The sample consists of 259 firm-year observations for the period 1996–2002. The definition of variables is pro-
vided in Table 2. Estimates of the firm-specific constant terms are omitted for readability.
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the level of disclosure, so that when transparency
is sufficiently high, the relationship between graph
distortion and the ex-ante measure of the cost of
equity becomes positive. Results suggest that
while at low levels of transparency graph distor-
tion remains undetected, high levels of disclosure
uncover graph distortion, which results in an in-
crease in the risk perceived by users. Hence, users’
predictions can only be potentially affected by
graph distortion when the level of information pro-
vided by the company is low.
So far we have used an ex-ante measure of the
cost of equity based on analysts’ estimations of
earnings per share. Hence, our results could be in-
terpreted as evidence that graph distortion affects
users’ (analysts’) perceptions of corporate per-
formance. However, it is important to check that
the market is able to correct individuals’ biases.
With this aim, in the next section we present the
results obtained using average ex-post returns as a
proxy for the cost of equity.
4.2.2. Ex-post measure of the cost of equity (stock
returns)
As a starting point in our ex-post analysis, we es-
timate a one-factor asset-pricing model for each of
the 68 companies in our sample.25 The average co-
efficients and adjusted R’s squared of these esti-
mations are presented in Table 8 (Model 1).
Results show a mean beta of 0.84 and a mean ad-
justed R-squared of 26.4%. We proceed by adding
a factor aimed at representing favourable graph
distortion (RGDFAVfactor). Specifically, we esti-
mate the following equation:
Rjm – Rfm = aj + bj (RMm – Rfm) (5)
+ cj RGDFAVfactorm + εjm
where:
Rjm – Rfm = monthly excess return for firm j.
RMm – Rfm = monthly excess return on the market
portfolio
RGDFAVfactorm = return to the graph distortion
factor mimicking portfolio
Average coefficients obtained from firm-
specific estimations of Equation (5) are reported in
Table 8 (Model 2). Results show that stock returns
are not affected by the distortion of graphs includ-
ed in the annual report. The coefficient of the
RGDFAV factor is negative but it is insignificant-
ly different from zero. Hence, we find support for
our hypothesis H3. Results (unreported) are simi-
lar when we construct the RGDFAV factor relay-
ing on favourably distorted graphs representing
financial variables. Although these variables might
exert a higher influence on users’ decisions than
non-financial variables, results show that stock re-
turns are not affected by the distortion of financial
graphs. These results are in accordance with the
EMH and suggest that decision makers (at the ag-
gregated level) are able to see through distortion.
Their decisions cannot be biased by means of ‘rosy’
graphs depicting a much more favourable view of
corporate performance than that reflected in the fi-
nancial statements. Nonetheless, results presented
in the previous section show the existence of a
negative and significant relationship between
favourable graph distortion and the ex-ante meas-
ure of the cost of equity. One way to explain these
apparently contradicting findings is that individu-
als’ perceptions can be biased because of distorted
graphs, but the aggregation process performed by
the stock market leads to unbiased decisions. Prior
research shows that the aggregation of individual’s
predictions leads to higher levels of accuracy (e.g.
Solomon, 1982 and Chalos, 1985). Furthermore,
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Table 8
Firm-specific regressions of stock returns on the market portfolio and the graph distortion factor
Model 1: Rjm – Rfm = aj + bj (RMm – Rfm) + εjm
Model 2: Rjm – Rfm = aj + bj (RMm – Rfm) + cj RGDFAVfactorm + εjm
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
Constant 0.004 0.529 0.005 0.520
RMm – Rfm 0.836 0.020 0.851 0.012
RGDFAVfactorm –0.130 0.326
R-squared 0.264 0.296
The table reports the average coefficient estimates obtained from the estimation of the asset-pricing models for
each company included in our sample. A minimum of 18 monthly stock returns for the period June 1997 to
May 2004 is required. The definition of variables is provided in Table 2.
25 A minimum of 18 monthly returns is required in these es-
timations.
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Easton and Sommers (2007) provide evidence
showing that the market undoes the optimistic bias
in analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, the possibility ex-
ists that analysts’ estimations of earnings per share
(the base for the ex-ante measure of the cost of 
equity) are influenced by graph distortion, even
though stock prices resulting from the aggregation
of a large number of decisions are not biased by
distorted graphs.
To further investigate this issue, following
Easton and Sommers (2007), we recalculate the
RPEG measure using realised earnings instead of
analysts’ earnings forecasts. By doing so the RPEG
measure becomes an ex-ante measure of the cost
of equity based on perfect foresight, since it is not
based on estimations but on realised earnings. We
re-estimate Equation (2) using this measure as the
dependent variable. Unreported results, available
from the authors, show that this measure of the
cost of equity is not affected by graph distortion.
Even when we focus our attention on financial
graphs we do not observe any significant relation-
ship between graph distortion and this perfect fore-
sight measure of the cost of equity. These results
corroborate the intuition gathered from previous
analyses. Individuals’ (analysts’) perceptions are
biased and distorted graphs affect this bias, but the
market is able to correct these misperceptions.
Once this bias in expectations is removed, the ef-
fect of graph distortion on the cost of equity disap-
pears. Our results are consistent with those
reported in previous experimental studies showing
that individuals’ perceptions are affected by graph
distortion (e.g. Beattie and Jones, 2002 and
Arunachalam et al., 2002). We extend these results
by providing evidence of the effect of graph distor-
tion on individuals’ (analysts’) estimations in a
real setting, instead of a controlled experiment.
Additionally, we show that the bias in individuals’
expectations is corrected in the capital market.
Hence, despite the efforts made by companies to
create a more favourable impression on users, we
provide evidence showing that the aggregated
market response is not biased by distorted graphs.
5. Conclusions
The wide use of graphs in corporate annual reports
together with the frequency with which they are
distorted to portray a more favourable view of cor-
porate performance, suggest that companies expect
benefits from using and distorting graphs. In other
words, distorted graphs are used by companies as
an impression management technique. This ‘ma-
nipulation hypothesis’ is confirmed, for example,
by the time-series analysis of Beattie and Jones
(2000). However, the information depicted in
graphs is usually presented also in a numerical 
format in the annual report. Using the terminology
of Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), graphs 
do not provide any ‘incremental information’.
Consequently, market efficiency would imply that
stock prices should not be affected by the use of dis-
torted graphs to display information already avail-
able in the financial statements or other sections of
the annual report. We can call this second hypothe-
sis the ‘absence of incremental information’ hy-
pothesis. To the best of our knowledge, our study is
the first to test these two hypotheses by investigat-
ing the effect of graph distortion on the cost of eq-
uity capital both on an ex-ante and an ex-post basis.
Using a sample of companies quoted on the
MSE, we obtain the following results. In accor-
dance with the EMH, we find that ex-post stock re-
turns are not affected by the distortion of graphs
included in the annual report. Nonetheless, we ob-
serve a robust negative relationship between
favourable graph distortion and ex-ante measures
of the cost of equity. This negative relationship,
however, is moderated by the overall level of dis-
closure, so that at high levels of transparency the
relationship between graph distortion and the ex-
ante measure of the cost of equity becomes posi-
tive. Results suggest that disclosure uncovers
graph distortion which in turn leads to a higher risk
being perceived.
In order to understand our results, it is important
to distinguish between analysts’ expectations and
aggregated market behaviour. Since ex-ante meas-
ures of the cost of equity are based on analysts’
forecasts, results indicate that analysts’ estimations
can be biased when graphs are distorted to portray
a more favourable view of the company, especial-
ly when the overall level of information provided
is low. These results are consistent with existing
theories on the effects of herding and limited atten-
tion on the use of information in capital markets.26
These theories predict that a focus on relative per-
formance evaluation can induce analysts to neglect
some of their detailed private information and to
focus on coarser and more readily available indica-
tors that summarise the existing information.
After analysts’ forecasts have been formed, in-
vestors take their buying and selling decisions and
these decisions determine the ex-post measure of
the cost of equity, which is not found to be affect-
ed by distorted graphs. Hence, the limited attention
effects are only transitory, because they disappear
once the market settles. This means that with the
passing of time, market activity is able to correct
individuals’ misperceptions, so that stock returns
are not affected by distorted graphs. These results
are related to those reported by Easton and
Sommers (2007) showing that the market undoes
the optimistic bias in analysts’ forecasts. However,
we extend their analysis in two ways. First, we
Vol. 39 No. 2. 2009 99
26 These theories have been reviewed in the previous sections.
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highlight graph distortion as a significant determi-
nant of this bias. Second, we show that their 
result is robust to the use of a three-factor model as
a measure of ex-post cost of equity as proposed by
Fama and French (1993).
Since the analysis was conducted in a relatively
underdeveloped capital market, where herding be-
haviour and heuristic trading are more likely, we
conjecture that, in spite of the documented preva-
lence of graph usage and graph distortion in 
countries with highly developed capital markets
(e.g. the UK and the US), it is unlikely that firms
in these countries will achieve a reduction in their
realised cost of equity by means of distorted
graphs. However, further research is needed to 
investigate whether analysts’ estimations are also
biased because of distorted graphs in highly 
developed capital markets.
Our empirical evidence also sheds some addi-
tional light on the relationship between disclosure
and the cost of equity. Both Espinosa and
Trombetta (2007) and Gietzmann and Ireland
(2005) show the important role played by account-
ing policy choice as a conditioning factor in this
relationship. Our results show that disclosure in-
teracts also with graph distortion as a determinant
of the cost of equity.
More generally, we provide some initial evi-
dence on the economic effects of materially dis-
torted graphs. The previous literature had already
documented the fact that a considerable number of
graphs presented in annual reports are distorted.
The minimum level of distortion necessary to 
influence users’ perceptions was also established
through experimental studies. Building on these
important findings, we have extended the analysis
and investigated the effects of graph bias on the
cost of equity. However, this is only one of the
possible economic variables that can be affected.
The task of investigating the effects of distorted
graphs on other economic variables is left to future
research.
Finally, Steinbart (1989) and Beattie and Jones
(2002) advocate regulatory intervention and the
involvement of auditors in order to eliminate graph
distortion. This proposal is based on the presump-
tion that any misrepresentation of firms’ financial
performance potentially misleads users of annual
reports. Our results have some important implica-
tions for this debate. Drawing on prior experimen-
tal evidence, we enhance our understanding of the
significant economic effects of graph distortion
outside a controlled laboratory environment. The
fact that, over time, the market is able to correct 
individuals’ misperceptions caused by distorted
graphs does not diminish their importance with 
regard to the continuous functioning of the stock
market. Consequently, our results support the no-
tion that there is a rationale for the enforcement of
regulatory action to avoid significant graph distor-
tion. At the same time, our findings also under-
score the complexity of the influences that graphs
have on economic decisions and they call for an
increased effort to advance knowledge on how
graphs affect economic behaviour.
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Appendix
Measures of the ex-ante cost of equity capital
All three alternative proxies for the ex-ante cost of equity capital that we use in the paper are based on the 
valuation model known as the Abnormal Earnings Growth Valuation Model. The general valuation formula 
according to this model is as follows:
(A.1)
where:
Pt = closing price of the month of June
xt = earnings at time t
r = cost of equity capital
dt = the dividend payout at time t
AEGt = abnormal earnings growth rate at time t.
Starting from this general valuation formula, each of the three proxies is obtained by making some restrictive
assumptions on the parameters of the model (cf. Easton and Monahan, 2005). The expressions for each of the
three measures are as follows:
a) Price to Forward Earnings Model (PEF)
(A.2)
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